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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael Malik Allah appeals the District Court's order 
granting the motion of defendants Humza Al-Hafeez and 
William W. Ennis for judgment on the pleadings and 
dismissing Allah's claims alleging infringement of his First 
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Amendment right to free exercise of religion in violation of 
42 U.S.C. S 1983. The appeal requires us to interpret the 
scope of S 803(d)(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
("PLRA"), codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e), and to determine 
its applicability to Allah's First Amendment claims. 
 
I. 
 
Allah, who was granted leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis, filed his pro se complaint on October 15, 1996, 
naming as defendants Ennis, the chaplain for S.C.I. 
Frackville, and Al-Hafeez, the appointed outside minister 
for the Nation of Islam within S.C.I. Frackville. Allah, a 
follower of the Nation of Islam, alleges that his First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion1 and that of 
other followers of the Nation of Islam in S.C.I. Frackville is 
being violated because Al-Hafeez is not a member of the 
Nation of Islam and engages in teachings that contradict 
the teachings of Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the Nation 
of Islam.2 His complaint states that he seeks injunctive 
relief as well as $10,000 from each defendant in 
compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. 
 
On April 30, 1997, Allah filed an amended complaint 
adding 26 defendants (mostly prison officials and guards) 
and alleging that they harassed him in retaliation for filing 
this lawsuit and trying to practice his religion. The District 
Court treated Allah's filing as a motion to amend his 
complaint and, over objection by Ennis and Al-Hafeez, 
granted the motion, stating that "Defendants' contentions 
may be raised by a Motion for Summary Judgment 
following completion of discovery." Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. He also alleged violation of his substantive due process rights and 
violation of federal and state law. Those claims are not at issue in this 
appeal. 
 
2. The complaint is signed by 21 members of the Nation of Islam at S.C.I. 
Frackville and is accompanied by affidavits of members of the Nation of 
Islam at S.C.I. Frackville concerning the teachings of Al-Hafeez. Included 
in the affidavits were affidavits of Rabiq V. Muhammad and Khalil Wali 
Muhammad, who were also named as plaintiffs in the action. Rabiq V. 
Muhammad was dismissed by order entered July 29, 1997. Khalil Wali 
Muhammad does not appeal the grant of judgment on the pleadings. 
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96-6587 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 1997). However, apparently 
those 26 additional defendants were never served with the 
amended complaint, and they were not added to the docket. 
 
In July 1997, Allah was transferred from S.C.I. Frackville 
to S.C.I. Greene. On April 3, 1998, Ennis and Al-Hafeez 
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. They argued 
that Allah's complaint against them should be dismissed 
because his claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by 
his transfer and because his claims for damages were 
barred under the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e). By order 
dated April 22, 1998, the District Court granted the motion.3 
After dismissing the complaint against Al-Hafeez and Ennis 
upon their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court 
closed the case without addressing the remaining 26 
unserved defendants and the retaliation claims alleged 
against them in the amended complaint. Allah timely 
appealed. 
 
This court appointed counsel to represent Allah on appeal.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court also stated in its order that Allah's claims against 
defendants Al-Hafeez and Ennis were dismissed "because the `Religious 
Practices Claims' represent a doctrinal dispute within the Muslim 
religion." Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 96-6587 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1998). This 
was not an argument presented by defendants in their motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and they concede on appeal that "Allah's 
complaint against them does implicate First Amendment concerns." 
Appellees' Br. at 11 n.3. Given the facts alleged in the complaint and our 
duty to construe those facts liberally, we agree with the parties that, to 
the extent the statement was intended to serve as an alternate basis for 
the court's ruling, the District Court erred in dismissing the claims on 
that ground at this juncture. See Cruz v. Beto , 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); 
Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 764 & n.3, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1996), 
overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997); SapaNajin v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463, 464 (8th Cir. 1988); see also 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div. , 450 U.S. 707, 715- 
16 (1981) (courts should accept assertions of intrafaith differences 
unless claim is so bizarre or clearly nonreligious in motivation as not to 
be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause). 
 
4. We express our appreciation to appellant's counsel for volunteering 
their services in this and numerous other civil rights cases. Schnader 
Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, the firm representing Allah in this appeal, 
and an increasing number of other lawyers in the Third Circuit who 
agree to act as counsel at the request of the courts act in the highest 
tradition of service of the legal profession. 
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We also granted the United States Department of Justice 
leave to intervene to defend the constitutionality of 
S 1997e(e). The appeal was consolidated with another 
appeal brought by Allah in a separate case captioned Allah 
v. Seiverling, No. 97-3627. The two consolidated appeals 
present distinct legal issues, and we address the issues in 
separate opinions. 
 
We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final order 
of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. As this is an 
appeal from the District Court's dismissal of Allah's 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), we exercise plenary 
review, accepting as true all of the allegations in the 
complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 
Allah. See Turbe v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 938 
F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991); Jablonski v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988). The 
District Court's judgment may be affirmed only if no relief 
can be granted under any set of facts that could be proved. 
See Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428. 
 
II. 
 
Section 1997e(e), entitled "Limitation on recovery," 
provides: 
 
       No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner 
       confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, 
       for mental or emotional injury suffered while in 
       custody without a prior showing of physical injury. 
 
Allah concedes that his claims for injunctive relief were 
mooted by his transfer from S.C.I. Frackville to S.C.I. 
Greene and that only his claims for damages remain. 
Therefore, our examination of S 1997e(e) focuses on 
whether the section precludes Allah's claims for damages. 
 
Allah emphasizes that he is seeking damages for harm 
allegedly suffered as a result of the defendants' violation of 
his First Amendment rights. The plain language of 
S 1997e(e) makes no distinction between the various claims 
encompassed within the phrase "federal civil action" to 
which the section applies. We turn first to consider Allah's 
claims for compensatory damages. 
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It is well settled that compensatory damages under 
S 1983 are governed by general tort-law compensation 
theory. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978). In 
other words, "damages are available under [S 1983] for 
actions `found . . . to have been violative of . . . 
constitutional rights and to have caused compensable 
injury . . . .' " Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975)). 
 
In elaborating on this principle, the Supreme Court has 
explained that compensatory damages for claims brought 
under S 1983 for violations of constitutional rights "may 
include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary 
harms, but also such injuries as `impairment of reputation 
. . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish and 
suffering.' " Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 
U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (quoting Gerte v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). By the same token, however, the 
Court held that substantial damages may only be awarded 
to compensate for actual injury suffered as a result of the 
violation of a constitutional right. See id. at 308. Indeed, in 
that case the Court overturned a substantial jury verdict 
for the plaintiff because the jury had been erroneously 
instructed to place their own subjective value on the 
constitutional rights transgressed. See also Carey, 435 U.S. 
at 248 (absent proof of actual injury, compensatory 
damages may not be awarded); Makin v. Colorado Dep't of 
Corrections, 183 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(reversing an award of damages for a free exercise claim 
where the district court calculated damages based on an 
abstract, per diem calculation rather than on evidence of 
actual mental or emotional harm suffered by prisoner). 
"[T]he abstract value of a constitutional right," the Supreme 
Court has stated, "may not form the basis forS 1983 
damages." Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308. 
 
We see no construction of Allah's complaint that would 
save his claims for compensatory damages from the bar 
imposed by S 1997e(e). Allah seeks substantial damages for 
the harm he suffered as a result of defendants' alleged 
violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion. As we read his complaint, the only actual injury 
that could form the basis for the award he seeks would be 
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mental and/or emotional injury. Under S 1997e(e), however, 
in order to bring a claim for mental or emotional injury 
suffered while in custody, a prisoner must allege physical 
injury, an allegation that Allah undisputedly does not 
make. Accordingly, Allah's claims for compensatory 
damages are barred by S 1997e(e) and were appropriately 
dismissed. 
 
Allah relies on footnote 14 in the Stachura opinion as 
support for the proposition that a jury could measure the 
value of the infringement on his constitutional rights 
without basing it on any mental or emotional injury. That 
footnote is not helpful here because it refers to a narrow 
category of cases in which compensatory damages may be 
presumed, i.e., voting rights cases. See 477 U.S. at 311 
n.14 (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)). As the 
Court explained in the text of Stachura, presumed damages 
are designed to "roughly approximate the harm that the 
plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that 
may be impossible to measure." Id. at 316. Therefore, even 
assuming arguendo that presumed damages are available 
for a First Amendment free exercise claim, but see Spence 
v. Board of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1986) (no 
presumed damages for violations of First Amendment free 
speech and free association rights), that claim would still be 
"for mental or emotional injury suffered" under the facts as 
alleged in this case and would be barred by S 1997e(e) 
absent a showing of prior physical injury. 
 
But our determination that S 1997e(e) bars Allah's claims 
for compensatory damages does not mean that the section 
bars all of his claims for damages. On the contrary, the 
Supreme Court recognized in both Carey and Stachura that 
certain absolute constitutional rights may be vindicated by 
an award of nominal damages in the absence of any 
showing of injury warranting compensatory damages. See 
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308 n.11 ("[N]ominal damages, and 
not damages based on some undefinable `value' of infringed 
rights, are the appropriate means of `vindicating' rights 
whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury."); 
Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 (approving recovery of nominal 
damages without proof of actual injury). After Carey, federal 
courts have consistently awarded nominal damages for 
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violations of First Amendment rights. See, e.g. , LeBlanc- 
Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 431 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(awarding nominal damages for Fair Housing Act and 
conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights claims); Wolfel 
v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(affirming award of nominal damages for violation of 
prisoner's First Amendment rights). 
 
Although Allah does not expressly seek nominal damages 
in his complaint, this court has held that "it is not 
necessary to allege nominal damages." Basista v. Weir, 340 
F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965). Moreover, the allegations in 
Allah's complaint are consistent with a claim for nominal 
damages, and he has asserted that he seeks nominal 
damages in his brief on appeal. Cf. Davis v. District of 
Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining 
to construe complaint to seek nominal damages where 
complaint sought only damages for mental or emotional 
injury and neither plaintiff nor amicus mentioned a claim 
for nominal damages in briefs on appeal). Construing his 
pro se complaint liberally, we interpret Allah's complaint to 
request nominal damages. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (holding pro se complaint to 
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections , 165 F.3d 
803, 808 (10th Cir. 1999) (construing pro se complaint as 
seeking injunctive relief despite plaintiff's failure to 
expressly request such relief). 
 
Punitive damages may also be awarded based solely on a 
constitutional violation, provided the proper showing is 
made. See Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 
2000); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d at 87; see also Coleman v. 
Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[P]unitive 
damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. S 1983`when 
the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil 
motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous 
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.' ") 
(quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). "The 
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for 
his willful or malicious conduct and to deter others from 
similar behavior." Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306 n.9. 
Accordingly, to the extent that Allah's punitive damages 
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claims stem solely from the violation of his First 
Amendment rights, and not from any emotional or mental 
distress suffered therefrom, those claims are not claims 
brought "for mental or emotional injury suffered" and are 
not barred by S 1997e(e).5 
 
Given the Supreme Court's clear directive that nominal 
damages are available for the vindication of a constitutional 
right absent any proof of actual injury, we cannot agree 
with the position taken by Al-Hafeez and Ennis that 
Congress intended S 1997e(e) to bar all claims for damages 
brought under S 1983 without a prior showing of physical 
injury. The plain language of S 1997e(e) states that "[n]o 
federal civil action may be brought . . . for mental or 
emotional injury . . . without a prior showing of physical 
injury." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e) (emphasis added). Neither 
claims seeking nominal damages to vindicate constitutional 
rights nor claims seeking punitive damages to deter or 
punish egregious violations of constitutional rights are 
claims "for mental or emotional injury." We thus find more 
persuasive the position taken by the Department of Justice 
in its brief and argument as intervenor that S 1997e(e) bars 
claims for damages for mental or emotional injury but 
leaves untouched claims for damages brought to vindicate 
a constitutional right or to punish for violation of that right. 
 
The defendants' position would put us in conflict with the 
other courts of appeals who have faced similar issues. For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998), the 
first court of appeals to face the issue, held that a prisoner 
plaintiff was not barred under S 1997e(e) from asserting a 
claim for violation of his First Amendment rights. Similarly, 
in Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1999), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because we conclude that S 1997e(e) does not bar Allah's claims 
seeking nominal and punitive damages for the violation of his First 
Amendment rights, we do not reach Allah's challenge to the 
constitutionality of S 1997e(e) were it to bar all of Allah's claims for 
damages. However, we note that other courts of appeals to have faced 
such challenges have held that the section's limitation on damages 
withstands constitutional challenge. See Davis v. District of Columbia, 
158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Zehner v. Trigg , 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
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the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
S 1997e(e) did not bar a claim by prisoner plaintiffs seeking 
nominal damages and declaratory relief for deprivation of 
their First Amendment rights. Citing Canell, the court 
explained that "[a] prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a 
violation of his First Amendment rights aside from any 
physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have 
sustained." Id. 
 
The holding in Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 
1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is not to the contrary. In Davis, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that 
S 1997e(e) barred a plaintiff's claims for compensatory and 
punitive damages where those claims were based on the 
plaintiff's alleged emotional and mental distress suffered as 
a result of the violation of his constitutional right to 
privacy. In that case, the plaintiff alleged only emotional 
and mental distress resulting from the violation. See id. at 
1345. Moreover, neither the plaintiff nor his counsel on 
appeal mentioned a claim for nominal relief, and the court 
declined to construe the complaint to seek such relief. See 
id. at 1349. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's 
claims for punitive and compensatory damages were barred 
by S 1997e(e) because those claims stemmed from the 
allegations of emotional and mental injury. See id. at 1348. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we hold that Allah's claims for compensatory 
damages are barred by S 1997e(e) but that his claims for 
nominal damages are not barred by that provision. 
Furthermore, to the extent that Allah's claims for punitive 
damages are premised on the alleged violation of his right 
to free exercise of religion rather than on any emotional or 
mental distress suffered as a result of the violation, those 
claims also are not barred. Accordingly, we will affirm in 
part and reverse in part the order of the District Court 
granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Al-Hafeez 
and Ennis, and we will remand for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion.6 On remand, the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Of course, we express no view on the merits of Allah's claims, as they 
are not before us. 
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Court also should address the status of the 26 defendants 
whose joinder it authorized but who were overlooked in its 
order of dismissal. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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